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The Local Government Ombudsman is a cause,
rather than a cure, of widespread
maladministration with injustice.
We must challenge the anguish and misery caused to so many of our
citizens by unchecked maladminstration committed by local authorities,
which in so many cases is being ignored and endorsed by the Local
Government Ombudsman. The suffering of those who complain to the LGO
is often increased immensely on experiencing further injustice from the very
body that is meant to be an impartial watchdog.
People from all walks of life are contacting us to complain about the LGO's
bias, and many of them have been caused considerable anguish and even
ill-health by their experience. Of particular concern is the effect the
unaccountability of local councils, or of their ally, the Local Government
Ombudsman, is having on those living in economic hardship, or who suffer
from poor living conditions and bad health, and who are often in no position
to challenge their local council and then a complicit Local Government
Ombudsman. Injustice is heaped upon injustice when the
Government-funded watchdog is so concerned to protect the interests and
reputation of those he is meant to be watching that he has become inured to
turning away the very people he is paid to protect.
Rock-solid arguments and evidence are regularly ignored or dismissed by
the LGO, without an explanation that comes close to being satisfactory.
Maladministration committed by local government affects many thousands
of people every year, and the Local Government Ombudsman is failing to
reduce it because of his bias in favour of local councils, as well as the
ridiculously small penalties he imposes in the cases he decides to uphold.
Of the 11,600 complaints of maladministration sent to him that fell within his
remit to investigate in 2003/4, he described only 1.6%, i.e. 180 cases, as
'maladministration' in his Annual Report. This means that the press and TV
media can refer to these 180 cases alone as 'a finding of maladministration
by the Local Government Ombudsman'.
When he does decide to find maladministration according to his published
criteria, he chooses to report the vast majority of cases as 'local settlements',
sparing his local authority colleagues the embarrassment and accountability
associated with reports of council maladministration in the local
newspapers. Many complainants are also very unhappy with the insultingly
small sum in compensation that the LGO usually awards, and some even
reject the paltry sum on principle. The term 'local settlement' seems to imply
the consent of the culpable and aggrieved party, whereas this is often by no
means the case. We want all maladministration to be reported by the LGO as
maladministration, with no more subterfuge, and we want the media to be
able to report it as 'maladministration'.
The LGO often decides not to pursue a complaint because he chooses to
express the opinion that there has not been any 'material injustice' suffered
by the complainant, without defining what 'material injustice' is. He believes
he is given powers to do this by the 1974 Local Government Act. The LGO
website (2004) states:
'the 1974 Act does not define "injustice". It is left to the discretion of the
Ombudsman to say what it means in any particular case.'
We have been unable to find any reference to 'material' or 'significant'
injustice in this Act. Our research so far indicates that the Ombudsman is
required to investigate prima facie cases of maladministration with injustice.
He seems to have interpreted the legislation as allowing him to make up his
own definition of 'injustice'. When people start doing this, our common
language loses its meaning. He often exercises his perceived absolute
discretion not to investigate, or to discontinue an investigation, just because
he claims to consider there has not been enough injustice caused by the
alleged maladministration. In 2003/4, he exercised his 'discretion' not to
investigate in 2814 cases. He is currently able to get away with saying that
the injustice caused by the alleged maladministration was not serious
enough to warrant further action. He does not need to define how serious
the injustice has to be, or give any further explanation to anyone for his
subjective judgement. He and his representatives, the Investigators and
Deputy Ombudsmen, have given us strong grounds for the perception that
they do not feel obliged to give any explanation other than a subjective
impression for spurious decisions that cannot be verified, and that the
complainant is therefore unable to challenge.
What can you do if you want to challenge the Ombudsman's decision? Very
little. If you are wealthy enough, and prepared to lose a few thousand
pounds, you could decide to take the Ombudsman's decision to judicial
review. However, judges are very reluctant to find against the Ombudsman in
such circumstances, although it can happen. When it does happen, the
judge is in our experience only likely to instruct the Ombudsman to
reconsider the case, though our impression is that the LGO does not like his
decisions being challenged successfully in the courts. There was a case in
1999 where a member of the public nobly took an Ombudsman's decision to
judicial review after being granted leave to do so by the first judge, where the
Ombudsman seemed to avoid the likelihood of the second judge finding
against him by agreeing to reconsider the case before the judgement. Even
then, the LGO was able to get away with saying to the judge that he stood by
his initial decision not to investigate, and that he would likely limit the scope
of the new investigation, which hardly seems like a fair and open-minded
approach. We believe that using judicial review to challenge an LGO's
decision is an ultimately useless procedure, which the LGO can sabotage, as
well as potentially a very expensive one: the best way to challenge the unfair
decisions and findings of the LGO is for those people who have experienced
such injustice at first hand, and other decent people who believe in the value
of democratic accountability and the right of the individual to be protected
from unjust and self-serving bureaucracies, to join together in a campaign to
abolish the Commission for Local Administration, in the same way that the
Police Complaints Authority was abolished in 2004.
The Local Government Ombudsman's office, the Commission for Local
Administration, must be abolished, and replaced by an independent Local
Government Complaints Commission that investigates fairly and impartially,
that reports findings of 'maladministration' as 'maladministration' and not as
'local settlements', and that is prepared, and has the authority, to fine local
authorities heavily for maladministration, and to force councils to be
accountable to the public for the fines they have to pay.
Successful reform of the current Commission for Local Administration is
very unlikely given that its culture encourages such a benign approach to
local councils, and given that the judges (LGOs) in the cases brought by
members of the public against local councils are appointed after
consultation with the representatives of local government, (the Local
Government Association). We believe that the appointment of
Commissioners should be determined by the consumers of local
government services, and not influenced by the providers of those services,
as is currently the case.
Did you know that all three English Local Government Ombudsmen (2005)
are former Chief Executive Officers of Local Councils? One might wonder
how many Local Government Ombudsman investigations were carried out
into their own councils when they were CEOs. How did they then feel then
about the fact that the LGO only reports maladministration in a tiny number
of cases, and that the LGO overwhelmingly finds in favour of the council,
should the complainant of course be lucky enough to have his or her
complaint investigated at all? How did they, when themselves Chief
Executive Officers, feel about the possibility of negative media coverage of
their councils as a result of an LGO investigation? How much automatic
empathy do they currently feel with their colleagues who are currently CEOs
in councils they are asked to investigate by a member of the public?
How many of the Local Government Ombudsman's investigators are former
local council employees? Or rather, how many are not? To what extent do
they also empathise with their former colleagues in local authorities whose
work and decisions are under investigation as a result of a complaint to the
LGO? How many of them were capable, as local authority employees, of
making the same decisions, and carrying out the same actions, as the people
they are now investigating?
The abolition of the Commission for Local Administration is not an
unrealistic objective. There is an encouraging precedent with the founding of
the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) on 1 April 2004. It
replaced the discredited Police Complaints Authority, which was abolished
on 31 March 2004. It is interesting to consider the backgrounds of senior
staff of the IPCC with regard to the domain they investigate: the IPCC has a
chair, deputy chair and 15 Commissioners, and at the time of writing (July
2004) not one of them is a former police officer. Of its six directors and four
regional directors, currently only four incumbents are former police officers.
The LGO's office is unable to claim such detachment between the former
occupations of its senior staff, (or, we believe, many of its Investigators,) and
the institutions that taxpayers fund it to investigate.
It is time for the Commission for Local Administration to go the same way as
the old Police Complaints Authority, and that local authorities are made
properly accountable when they inflict injustice on our citizens, instead of
being backed-up by the biased institution, run by overpaid officials, that the
Nation currently funds.
... AND THE PRICE OF INJUSTICE?
How much does it cost to keep this discredited institution running?
Annual Grant from Government to the Commission for Local Administration,
(i.e. our taxes,) 2004/5: £11,058,000
Local Government Ombudsmen's salaries: Mr Redmond (Commission
Chairman) £147,198 (linked to the salary of a High Court Judge).
(£137,376 in 2002/3)
The other two Ombudsmen earned £100,000 - £110,000 in 2002/3.
Deputy Local Government Ombudsman's salary: circa £65,000, + £525
lunch allowance, (advertised April 2004, York Office).
Investigator's salary: £30,267 - £37,260 + lunch allowance £513,
(advertised January 2004).
rather than a cure, of widespread
maladministration with injustice.
We must challenge the anguish and misery caused to so many of our
citizens by unchecked maladminstration committed by local authorities,
which in so many cases is being ignored and endorsed by the Local
Government Ombudsman. The suffering of those who complain to the LGO
is often increased immensely on experiencing further injustice from the very
body that is meant to be an impartial watchdog.
People from all walks of life are contacting us to complain about the LGO's
bias, and many of them have been caused considerable anguish and even
ill-health by their experience. Of particular concern is the effect the
unaccountability of local councils, or of their ally, the Local Government
Ombudsman, is having on those living in economic hardship, or who suffer
from poor living conditions and bad health, and who are often in no position
to challenge their local council and then a complicit Local Government
Ombudsman. Injustice is heaped upon injustice when the
Government-funded watchdog is so concerned to protect the interests and
reputation of those he is meant to be watching that he has become inured to
turning away the very people he is paid to protect.
Rock-solid arguments and evidence are regularly ignored or dismissed by
the LGO, without an explanation that comes close to being satisfactory.
Maladministration committed by local government affects many thousands
of people every year, and the Local Government Ombudsman is failing to
reduce it because of his bias in favour of local councils, as well as the
ridiculously small penalties he imposes in the cases he decides to uphold.
Of the 11,600 complaints of maladministration sent to him that fell within his
remit to investigate in 2003/4, he described only 1.6%, i.e. 180 cases, as
'maladministration' in his Annual Report. This means that the press and TV
media can refer to these 180 cases alone as 'a finding of maladministration
by the Local Government Ombudsman'.
When he does decide to find maladministration according to his published
criteria, he chooses to report the vast majority of cases as 'local settlements',
sparing his local authority colleagues the embarrassment and accountability
associated with reports of council maladministration in the local
newspapers. Many complainants are also very unhappy with the insultingly
small sum in compensation that the LGO usually awards, and some even
reject the paltry sum on principle. The term 'local settlement' seems to imply
the consent of the culpable and aggrieved party, whereas this is often by no
means the case. We want all maladministration to be reported by the LGO as
maladministration, with no more subterfuge, and we want the media to be
able to report it as 'maladministration'.
The LGO often decides not to pursue a complaint because he chooses to
express the opinion that there has not been any 'material injustice' suffered
by the complainant, without defining what 'material injustice' is. He believes
he is given powers to do this by the 1974 Local Government Act. The LGO
website (2004) states:
'the 1974 Act does not define "injustice". It is left to the discretion of the
Ombudsman to say what it means in any particular case.'
We have been unable to find any reference to 'material' or 'significant'
injustice in this Act. Our research so far indicates that the Ombudsman is
required to investigate prima facie cases of maladministration with injustice.
He seems to have interpreted the legislation as allowing him to make up his
own definition of 'injustice'. When people start doing this, our common
language loses its meaning. He often exercises his perceived absolute
discretion not to investigate, or to discontinue an investigation, just because
he claims to consider there has not been enough injustice caused by the
alleged maladministration. In 2003/4, he exercised his 'discretion' not to
investigate in 2814 cases. He is currently able to get away with saying that
the injustice caused by the alleged maladministration was not serious
enough to warrant further action. He does not need to define how serious
the injustice has to be, or give any further explanation to anyone for his
subjective judgement. He and his representatives, the Investigators and
Deputy Ombudsmen, have given us strong grounds for the perception that
they do not feel obliged to give any explanation other than a subjective
impression for spurious decisions that cannot be verified, and that the
complainant is therefore unable to challenge.
What can you do if you want to challenge the Ombudsman's decision? Very
little. If you are wealthy enough, and prepared to lose a few thousand
pounds, you could decide to take the Ombudsman's decision to judicial
review. However, judges are very reluctant to find against the Ombudsman in
such circumstances, although it can happen. When it does happen, the
judge is in our experience only likely to instruct the Ombudsman to
reconsider the case, though our impression is that the LGO does not like his
decisions being challenged successfully in the courts. There was a case in
1999 where a member of the public nobly took an Ombudsman's decision to
judicial review after being granted leave to do so by the first judge, where the
Ombudsman seemed to avoid the likelihood of the second judge finding
against him by agreeing to reconsider the case before the judgement. Even
then, the LGO was able to get away with saying to the judge that he stood by
his initial decision not to investigate, and that he would likely limit the scope
of the new investigation, which hardly seems like a fair and open-minded
approach. We believe that using judicial review to challenge an LGO's
decision is an ultimately useless procedure, which the LGO can sabotage, as
well as potentially a very expensive one: the best way to challenge the unfair
decisions and findings of the LGO is for those people who have experienced
such injustice at first hand, and other decent people who believe in the value
of democratic accountability and the right of the individual to be protected
from unjust and self-serving bureaucracies, to join together in a campaign to
abolish the Commission for Local Administration, in the same way that the
Police Complaints Authority was abolished in 2004.
The Local Government Ombudsman's office, the Commission for Local
Administration, must be abolished, and replaced by an independent Local
Government Complaints Commission that investigates fairly and impartially,
that reports findings of 'maladministration' as 'maladministration' and not as
'local settlements', and that is prepared, and has the authority, to fine local
authorities heavily for maladministration, and to force councils to be
accountable to the public for the fines they have to pay.
Successful reform of the current Commission for Local Administration is
very unlikely given that its culture encourages such a benign approach to
local councils, and given that the judges (LGOs) in the cases brought by
members of the public against local councils are appointed after
consultation with the representatives of local government, (the Local
Government Association). We believe that the appointment of
Commissioners should be determined by the consumers of local
government services, and not influenced by the providers of those services,
as is currently the case.
Did you know that all three English Local Government Ombudsmen (2005)
are former Chief Executive Officers of Local Councils? One might wonder
how many Local Government Ombudsman investigations were carried out
into their own councils when they were CEOs. How did they then feel then
about the fact that the LGO only reports maladministration in a tiny number
of cases, and that the LGO overwhelmingly finds in favour of the council,
should the complainant of course be lucky enough to have his or her
complaint investigated at all? How did they, when themselves Chief
Executive Officers, feel about the possibility of negative media coverage of
their councils as a result of an LGO investigation? How much automatic
empathy do they currently feel with their colleagues who are currently CEOs
in councils they are asked to investigate by a member of the public?
How many of the Local Government Ombudsman's investigators are former
local council employees? Or rather, how many are not? To what extent do
they also empathise with their former colleagues in local authorities whose
work and decisions are under investigation as a result of a complaint to the
LGO? How many of them were capable, as local authority employees, of
making the same decisions, and carrying out the same actions, as the people
they are now investigating?
The abolition of the Commission for Local Administration is not an
unrealistic objective. There is an encouraging precedent with the founding of
the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) on 1 April 2004. It
replaced the discredited Police Complaints Authority, which was abolished
on 31 March 2004. It is interesting to consider the backgrounds of senior
staff of the IPCC with regard to the domain they investigate: the IPCC has a
chair, deputy chair and 15 Commissioners, and at the time of writing (July
2004) not one of them is a former police officer. Of its six directors and four
regional directors, currently only four incumbents are former police officers.
The LGO's office is unable to claim such detachment between the former
occupations of its senior staff, (or, we believe, many of its Investigators,) and
the institutions that taxpayers fund it to investigate.
It is time for the Commission for Local Administration to go the same way as
the old Police Complaints Authority, and that local authorities are made
properly accountable when they inflict injustice on our citizens, instead of
being backed-up by the biased institution, run by overpaid officials, that the
Nation currently funds.
... AND THE PRICE OF INJUSTICE?
How much does it cost to keep this discredited institution running?
Annual Grant from Government to the Commission for Local Administration,
(i.e. our taxes,) 2004/5: £11,058,000
Local Government Ombudsmen's salaries: Mr Redmond (Commission
Chairman) £147,198 (linked to the salary of a High Court Judge).
(£137,376 in 2002/3)
The other two Ombudsmen earned £100,000 - £110,000 in 2002/3.
Deputy Local Government Ombudsman's salary: circa £65,000, + £525
lunch allowance, (advertised April 2004, York Office).
Investigator's salary: £30,267 - £37,260 + lunch allowance £513,
(advertised January 2004).